

Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf (U)

Compiled and Reviewed by [Hayden B. Peake](#)

This section contains brief reviews of recent books of interest to both the intelligence professional and the student of intelligence.

The Secret Police and the Revolution: The Fall of the German Democratic Republic . By Edward N. Peterson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. 286 pages.

During the Cold War, defector and immigrant memoirs, Solzhenitsyn's works, and the scholarship of historians like Robert Conquest revealed to the world the malevolent practices of internal security organizations in communist states. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germany's security organ, the Ministry of State Security (*MfS*, or *Stasi*), had attained the reputation in the press as a brutally efficient monitor of social behavior. Details were scarce, however, especially in English.¹ With the reunification of Germany in October 1990 came the opening of the *Stasi* files revealing intelligence reports prepared during the 45 years of the German Democratic Republic's existence. Written with the expectation that they would never be seen outside the *Stasi* bureaucracy, they provided scholars with a mass of primary documents no one had anticipated. University of Wisconsin history professor Edward Peterson was quick to capitalize on the windfall. He had studied Germany since 1964 and, in 1994, was one of the first American scholars to gain access to the Ministry of State Security files, commonly called the Gauck Archive.²

In his book, Prof. Peterson focuses on the domestic role of the *MfS* , though he briefly mentions its foreign espionage element, the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA) headed by Markus Wolf. He gives a more severe picture of the HVA than Wolf does in his memoirs,³ noting that it "engaged in torture of 'enemies,' aided rightist extremists, supported efforts to sabotage nuclear plants, spread disinformation, and recorded BRD (West Germany) politicians' phone conversations."

After an introductory chapter covering the formation of the *MfS* in 1953 and its operations until 1979, the balance of the book addresses the *Stasi's* role in monitoring East German citizens from 1980 until reunification. The emphasis is on the big picture as opposed to case studies of particular operations. Using ubiquitous *inoffizieller Mitarbeiter* (unofficial informers), the *Stasi* penetrated the entire society, reporting on

the economy, the military, the churches, the workers, the dissidents, the corruption, and the GDR communist party itself. Ironically, Prof. Peterson discovered that the reports were accurate and the *MfS* was the first to realize, as early as 1986, that the days of the GDR were numbered, though its head, Erich Mielke, was not so frank in reporting this conclusion to the Politburo. In his chronological treatment, Prof. Peterson shows how the " *MfS* gradually moved from suppressing the opposition to joining it." Toward the end, as "the consumption-thinking citizens" gained strength, the *Stasi's* primary goal was to "prevent forcible entry" into its offices, and here, too, it failed. Though officials spent days destroying documents, they could not destroy all the copies.

Prof. Peterson's thoroughly documented account shows how the *Stasi* , formed on the Chekist model as the "sword and shield" of the Party, enjoyed great power until GDR citizens rebelled and the inherent weakness of the dictatorial system caused its demise.

The Stasi: Myth and Reality . By Mike Dennis. London, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2003. 269 pages.

After the reunification of Germany in 1990, the surviving files of the former East German Ministry of State Security (*MfS*), commonly called the *Stasi* , consumed 185 kilometers of shelf space! They recorded the information collected by a small army of some 200,000 domestic sources called *inoffizielle Mitarbeiter* (unofficial informers). Some were volunteers, but the majority were recruited under coercion to spy on their fellow citizens. Foreign threats were dealt with by an as yet undetermined number of officers and agents working mainly in West Germany, but in other countries as well.

Mike Dennis, professor of modern history at the University of Wolverhampton, tells the story of the *MfS* throughout the 45-year existence of the GDR. He considers the extent to which the *Stasi's* appellation--"sword and shield" of the Communist Party--was justified by examining the organization's origins, its operations, and the nature of the threats it faced. In contrast to Edward Peterson's more bureaucratic study,⁴ there is greater detail here about the *Stasi* case officers, their recruitment techniques, and the types of sources they cultivated--from ordinary citizens to scientists, educators, intellectual dissidents, and skinheads. He addresses their motives for cooperating and what happened to those who refused to play the game. The level of detail collected is astounding, as case after case makes clear.

Two of the 15 chapters are devoted to the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA), headed by Markus Wolf, and they show how this foreign intelligence arm fitted into the *MfS's* mission. The final two chapters deal with the collapse of communist rule, why the *Stasi* failed to prevent what many saw coming, and the *Stasi's* legacy.

Prof. Dennis provides a good mix of primary and secondary sources and sound analysis, though his finding that J. Edgar Hoover "is not too dissimilar from Mielke," the head of the *MfS* , suggests a weak grasp of American domestic security. Dennis concludes that the GDR collapsed not because the *Stasi* failed, although it played its part, but because of a national "legitimacy deficit" common to communist countries.

The *Stasi* myth was the belief that its efficiency could overcome communist inefficiency; the reality was that it could not.

The Stasi Files: East Germany's Operations Against Britain . By Anthony Glees. London, UK: Free Press, 2003. 461 pages.

In two respects, Anthony Glees, Reader of Politics and Director of Studies at Brunel University in England, has taken a different tack in his book on the Ministry of State Security (*Stasi*) when compared to Edward Peterson and Mike Dennis.⁵ First, he considers only HVA (East German foreign intelligence) operations involving British subjects. Second, his research is based on *Stasi* files that are no longer available to public examination due to the legal ramifications of the Helmut Kohl case.⁶

The book has four parts. The first describes, at excessive length, the problems associated with making sense of the files he discovered. Then he relates the background of the German Democratic Republic as a police state and its contacts with Britain until it achieved diplomatic recognition. Parts two and three tell of *Stasi* espionage in Britain, both the *HVA* and Military Intelligence, which was controlled by the *Stasi* . Part four describes the penetration of the British peace movement, and the recruitment and operational experiences of British penetration agents in other organizations.

Glees provides 12 pages of translated documents to which he apparently had exclusive access, except for the *HVA* itself. And he names a number of British *HVA* agents. But none of the agents identified are mentioned in the documents, which relate only to policy matters. In Appendix 5, he provides "precise details of every significant *HVA* operation in the UK"--but they are unintelligible in the format presented and no explanation is offered. Nevertheless, in the narrative he gives true names and discusses the cases of a number of British subjects, and, with one exception, none denied his assertions. The exception was Lord John Roper, a former Labour MP and later Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, commonly called Chatham House. Glees claims that Lord Roper was a *Stasi* "agent of influence." Lord Roper rebuffed the assertion in public and *The Times* promptly cancelled its serialization agreement for the book. It seems that Lord Roper's contacts with the *HVA* had been approved by the Foreign Office, something Lord Roper told Glees when interviewed for the book. But Glees knew better.

This is not an easy book to read and understand. It is awkwardly organized and its analysis is steadfastly mediocre. There is doubt that the conclusions are supported by the evidence and no way to check. Despite the inclusion of a glossary, some *HVA* terms are not defined correctly; e.g. , IMs are called *Informelle Mitarbeiter* ; whereas *Inoffizelle Mitarbeiter* is correct--Mike Dennis gets it right. Furthermore, the story is not "told with comprehensive footnotes" as claimed. Many paragraphs have none where they are badly needed. That even Glees is unsure about his exegesis is suggested in the conclusions when he asks: "Were the *Stasi's* British sources spies?" He goes on to state that one of the tasks of the East German intelligence service was to keep the regime in power. But that was not the mission of the *HVA* in Britain, which was the subject of the book.

Stasiland . By Anna Funder. London, UK: Granta Books, 2003. 288 pages.

At the Free University in West Berlin during the late 1980s, Australian Anna Funder learned that East Germany was "a kind of Utopia, where there was no unemployment, universal childcare, equal pay and no prostitution." But her inquisitive mind suggested that there must be something more to life there or they would not have built the Wall and East German citizens would not have risked all tunneling under it and climbing over it to get to the West. She wondered what life was really like in the East.

After a visit home, she returned to a reunified Germany without the Wall, got a job, and visited what was once East Berlin and its *Stasi* museums in Berlin and Leipzig. She began learning the stories of daily life that came to an end in November 1989. In *Stasiland* , her first book, she portrays life "beyond the Wall" in vivid terms through the stories she learned from former *Stasi* officers, *Stasi* victims, and those going through the *Stasi* files captured after the collapse of East Germany. When the end was clearly in sight, the *Stasi* began burning and shredding documents. The job was too big and 15,000 sacks of hand-torn documents were retrieved by the new authorities. Rather than complete the destruction, a team of 31 women--the "puzzle ladies"--began reassembling the pieces at a site in Nuremberg. At the present rate of success, it will take 375 years to finish the task! In the meantime, we have the collection of personal accounts assembled by Funder, told in a nimble but somber style that reveals a few of the tragedies that were the daily experience of East Germans for nearly 30 years.

At the *Runde Ecke* , the former *Stasi* headquarters in Leipzig, Funder found an exhibit of "smell jars" that once contained samples of human odors collected by the *Stasi* from citizens' clothes--often underwear--or other items that came in contact with the skin. The theory was that *Stasi* dogs could be trained to sniff the contents of the jars and then track a suspect. Samples from all political dissidents were collected, though the jars are now empty.

Funder heard of a woman named Miriam who had once tried to escape over the Wall and had been caught. She tracked her down and learned her story of two years in prison, brutal treatment, and the subsequent loss of her husband. Funder made other contacts by putting an ad in a Potsdam paper: "Australian seeks *Stasi* men, view [to] conversation, discretion guaranteed." She included her phone number and received many calls. One was from a former *Stasi* guard, another a teacher of "*Spezialdisziplin* , the science of recruiting informers. He showed her a counterintelligence study and tried to convince her that socialism would return someday. Frau Paul told the story of her baby who was in a West German hospital when the Wall went up and how she was kept from him until it came down again.

One senses that the stories are typical and not the product of Funder's imagination. There are no sources cited, though the museums that were helpful to her are still there. This is a disturbing yet valuable book about ordinary life in an extraordinary authoritarian state.

Amazons to Fighter Pilots: A Biographical Dictionary of Military Women, Volumes 1 & 2 . By

Reina Pennington. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. Vol. 1, A-Q, 350 pages. Vol. 2, R-Z, 410 pages.

Longtime reader interest in military history is easily documented by observing the books published each year on wars in all ages. Recently, a new topic in the field has gained public and academic attention: *women* in the military. Just how new the topic may be, is assessed by considering comments by military historians. Martin Van Creveld wrote in 1991: "Women have never taken a major part in combat in any culture, in any country, in any period of history."⁷ Similarly, in 1993, British historian John Keegan concluded that "Warfare is . . . the one human activity from which women, with the most significant exceptions, have always and everywhere stood apart. . . . Women . . . do not fight . . . and they never, in any military sense, fight men."⁸

These were fighting words to Reina Pennington, and she has produced a work to set the record straight. In her preface and introduction, she examines the reasons for historians' neglect of the role of women in war, while showing that biographers and memoirists have not always done so. Acknowledging that these two volumes are not comprehensive, she nonetheless argues that they substantiate the proposition that women have had a role in the military and, in particular, combat, throughout history.

Her entries range from antiquity to the Gulf War and include all major geographic regions of the world. Each contains sources for further reading. Most entries are not household names. For example, Queen Artemisia II of Halicarnassus (a city state in Turkey) commanded a fleet in the 4th century BC. Laxshmi Bhai led a military uprising after the British takeover of her homeland, Jhansi, in 19th century India. Many entries document Soviet women who became Heroes of the Soviet Union for their military activities in World War II. Marie-Babbe Parent became a soldier during the French revolution. In the 1970s, more than 250,000 women were actively engaged in the fight for independence in Zimbabwe. There are also many examples of women's role in the American Civil War. While the focus is on women who fought, there many examples of women involved in espionage and resistance movements. Sadly, one of the most important, Virginia Hall, who served both the British SOE and American OSS, is not mentioned. But, overall, the coverage remains most impressive.

To facilitate access to the alphabetical entries, the table of contents is broken down by geographic regions, time periods, branch of service, POW actions, and various organizations. There is also a chronology and bibliographic surveys of women as POWs and in medicine. This is an extraordinarily valuable contribution to military history and to the literature of intelligence.

Hidden Secrets: A Complete History of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It. By David Owen. Toronto: Firefly Books Ltd., 2002. 224 pages.

This "complete history of espionage" is presented in five parts that the author labels: HUMINT, SIGINT, ELINT, False Intelligence, and IMINT. Each is illustrated with photographs, many in color, and they cover a span of time from China's Sun Tzu to 11 September 2001. The details are necessarily sketchy since the coverage is broad and

the number of pages relatively few, but most of the main espionage figures and technical collection systems are mentioned. There is much less coverage of the toys of espionage. Those interested in that aspect had best consult Keith Melton's *Ultimate Spy*.⁹

Owen's big picture is accurate, but the details in many cases are not. For example, Operation MINCEMEAT, popularized in Ewen Montagu's book, *The Man Who Never Was*,¹⁰ was not the "totally successful" deception Owen makes it out to be.¹¹ When discussing the Hanssen case, Owen repeats the story that Hanssen was influenced "as a boy" by Philby's memoirs. This could not have happened, of course, since Philby's book was not published until Hanssen was 24 years old. On the topic of the Cambridge spies, Anthony Blunt was not their leader, nor did the group include four undergraduates--all were recruited after they left Cambridge as students. MI5 (the British Security Service) was not the Army counterintelligence service, Donald Maclean was not suspected of leaking nuclear secrets--though in fact that is part of what he had done--and Philby was not allowed to remain in MI6.

As a brief introduction to the topic of espionage, *Hidden Secrets* will be of value to those seeking a general overview, but it is far from the "Complete History" indicated in the sub-title, and all facts should be checked with other sources before being accepted.

A Tremor In The Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector. By David T. Lykken. Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1998. 333 pages.

Many readers of this entry will know from personal experience that the term "lie detector" is a fiction kept alive by the media, including publishers, who just cannot resist the expression, accurate or not. The author uses the term in parentheses most of the time, preferring "polygraph" as the proper descriptor for what he calls an "intrusive and humiliating procedure." He goes on to say that polygraph methods are not science, and that there is "enough evidence to say that an innocent person has nearly a 50/50 chance of [failing a ?] lie detector test, odds that are much worse than in Russian Roulette." His position is clear from the outset, but the book has some value since it discusses the many applications of the polygraph with its pros and cons, giving specific examples. He also describes related techniques: for example, the "guilty knowledge test," a procedure for which he expresses some hope as a replacement for the polygraph. There is a chapter on ways to beat the polygraph, a procedure that he recommends, though he does not say what to do when told that trying to deceive the polygraph or the operator is wrong and can be detected.

Lykken, a professor of psychology at the University of Minnesota, uses a number of intelligence agency examples to make his points. One involving the CIA is based on the premise that the validity of the polygraph is "no better than chance," though proof is lacking. In the chapter titled "Screening by Federal Agencies," he mentions the FBI's policy of polygraphing new special agents, a practice Lykken finds "difficult to understand," since "it was the CIA . . . that was experiencing the problem of moles." Obviously, counterintelligence is not his strength. The problems of polygraph misuse are illustrated by the Naval Investigative Service's response to the Moscow Embassy

Marine Guard scandal, involving Clayton Lonetree.

Tremor In The Blood gives all the arguments against the polygraph, citing psychological study after study. But it is difficult, at least for the lay person, to tell when a psychologist is right in his judgments. There is, however, some utility in this book--probably unintended--in that it also makes the point, indirectly, that when used as one tool by experienced operators, the polygraph has value.

Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies . By Lt. Col. R. W. G., Stephens. Introduction by Oliver Hoare. Kew, UK: Public Records Office, 2000). 376 pages.

John Masterman's *The Double-Cross System* was the first book to tell the now-well-known story of how Britain's Twenty Committee ran double agents against Germany during World War II.¹² The 1995 reissue of the book contains an elegant introduction by historian Nigel West that reveals the problems Masterman had getting permission to publish what was, after all, an official classified history of wartime counterintelligence operations that he had written in 1945 while serving in MI5. Following his successful precedent, several of the double agents involved published their memoirs. And while they described their own roles in some detail, the question of how they were recruited as double agents after their capture in England was not treated with specificity.

Perhaps the earliest mention of that topic occurred in the 1971 book *The Games of the Foxes*, by Ladislav Farago, when he described "Latchmere House" as the prison where suspected agents were taken for interrogation. Farago also named the prison commandant, "Tin Eye" Stephens (author of the book under discussion), but added little else.¹³ Then, in the 1980s, authors Richard Deacon and Nigel West devoted a chapter to "Camp 020" in their book *SPY!* , but did not indicate their sources.¹⁴ It was not until 1999, when the Public Record Office (PRO) published John Curry's official history of the Security Service (MI5), that there was official, though still limited, recognition of Camp 020's critical contribution to the Double-Cross operation. Only in 2000, with the publication of this official history of the "spy prison," *Camp 020*, written by Lt. Col. Stephens in 1946, did the entire story become clear.

The book, as issued, contains four parts. First comes the fascinating introduction by Oliver Hoare that gives details about the book's origins with commentary about its quirky author, Stephens, and his unusual staff. Not all of the original documents are included. A 54-page case study was omitted, Hoare explains, for reasons of redundancy, though that reason alone is suspect on general principles--the reader could have made that judgment equally well.

The three remaining parts include what Stephens called his "digest" of Camp 020's history that he titled: "A Digest of Ham." The name came from the camp's location near Ham Common, London. The other two parts are case summaries that tell when and how the nearly 500 suspect Nazi agents arrived, the role of ULTRA or ISOS decryptations, the circumstances of their apprehension, details of their interrogations, the nature of the intelligence obtained, the ultimate disposition of the inmates, and the selection criteria used--some stayed in prison; some were executed; some, though

relatively few, became part of the Double-Cross operation. We also learn about the interrogation techniques used (valuable even today), the difficulties of analyzing and handling the data collected, what it is that makes people betray their country or their espionage assignments, and the value of such an operation to the war and intelligence generally.

Col. Stephens was an eccentric--his nickname referred to the monocle he wore--and his narrative comments often suggest his biases. Furthermore, historians looking for documentation will find little; thus, for particular cases, work in the archives is still a necessity. Nevertheless, *Camp 020* will be an immense help as a road map to research.[15](#)

Female Intelligence: Women and Espionage in the First World War. By Tammy M. Proctor. New York, NY: New University Press, 2003. 204 pages.

While writing an article on British Girl Guides, social historian Tammy Proctor was surprised when she encountered documents indicating that some of these teenagers had served in the Security Service (MI5) during World War I. Expanding her research to include women who served the British intelligence community during the war, she discovered that at a time when women could not vote or hold political office, more than 6,000 had worked in a variety of sensitive intelligence-related positions. They ranged in age from 16-year-old Girl Guides to 80-year-old grandmothers. They served as clerks and couriers, telephone and telegraph operators, code and cipher analysts, and spies behind enemy lines in Europe. Their exploits have been little recorded and, Proctor argues, the stereotype--the image of the sexy female spy--that emerged from this period has long masked the realities of the female contribution.

In the first of six chapters of *Female Intelligence*, Proctor provides a summary of British espionage from Elizabeth I to the 20th century, describing the *ad hoc* nature of its development and pointing out the role of women, for example in the famous 1894 Alfred Dreyfus case. Chapter two examines the *Defense of the Realm Act* (DORA)--analogous to today's Patriot Act, though received with more understanding if not enthusiasm--that imposed harsh restrictions on women and foreigners as it changed the nature of MI5's counterespionage program. Chapter three tells of "women behind the scenes" in Britain, while chapter four describes the well-known White Lady (La Dame Blanche) network that functioned in Belgium.[16](#) Several women lost their lives in the course of their work. Two of the most important, though relatively unknown, were Louise de Bettignies and Gabrielle Petit. The former was a French woman who served as a British agent in an impressive but short career before her capture. The latter was a Belgian who often worked in disguise collecting order-of-battle data behind German lines. She was captured and executed at age 23. Their stories are told in chapter five. The final chapter, *Intimate Traffic with the Enemy*, deals with the popular image of "female spies as seductresses." While the most well known is Mata Hari, one of the more interesting was Marthe McKenna who was "guardedly friendly" with Germans while collecting information from other female agents for the British.

Proctor is sensitive to the image of women as sexual objects "sleeping their way into the spy world," suggesting that the stereotype has persisted far too long without

justification, thanks to books written by men. She provides ample evidence. She does admit that Allen Dulles wrote "sex and hard-headed intelligence operatives rarely mix," though she sees this as implying that "all intelligence officers are male." She concludes that the problem has not yet been solved while citing evidence that progress has been made.

The Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. By W. Thomas Smith, Jr. New York, NY: Checkmark Books, Facts-on-File, 2003. 282 pages.

An encyclopedia is defined as a comprehensive reference work containing full, complete, in-depth, thorough, wide-ranging, all-encompassing, accurate, exhaustive, articles on numerous aspects of a particular field, usually arranged alphabetically.¹⁷ Thomas Smith's entry into the field falls short on nearly every count, save it is alphabetically arranged. A journalist and onetime adjunct professor of journalism at the University of South Carolina, Smith takes a less than scholarly approach to his task and begins by characterizing the CIA as "the government's incarnation of the world's oldest profession."

The assortment of entries he has assembled is incomplete and filled with too many errors of fact. Examples of the latter include: saying that Churchill gave Sir William Stephenson the codename INTREPID (Churchill did not and INTREPID was not his codename); labeling Kim Philby a double agent who became a communist at Cambridge (both are incorrect); claiming that the "December 1975 issue of *Counterspy* published . . . the name, title, and home address of the Athens CIA Chief of Station (COS) Richard Welch;"¹⁸ identifying SMERSH as an assassination element of the KGB; claiming that FBIS is sometimes called the Foreign Broadcasting *Intelligence* Service and that it is the "CIA's broadcast journalism arm;" calling Mossadegh the head of the *de facto* government of Iran (it was elected); stating that Jonathan Pollard applied to the CIA while in law school (he did not go to law school); describing Robert Hanssen as a double agent, claiming that his espionage career began in 1985 (it began in 1979), and failing to mention his GRU approaches; calling James Angleton the "unofficial founder of CIA CI" (nor was he the official founder, for that matter), and alleging that he was "allowed to bug the residences and office telephones of high ranking officials . . . as he saw fit;" and claiming that the Signal Intelligence Service began "decoding the [VENONA] messages on 1 February 1943" (that happened much later). Other entries leave one wondering why they were included--George Kennan, for one, though Thomas might have pointed out that it was Kennan who was US Ambassador in Moscow when the bug in the Great Seal of the United States was discovered in 1952.

Thomas omits many important defectors, for example: Yuri Artamonov (a.k.a. SHADRIN), Peter Deriabin (KGB), and Peter Popov (the first CIA Soviet GRU agent). Anatoli Golitsyn is mentioned in passing as "the defector who knew of Philby's betrayal" (incorrect), but he is not in the index. Important agents are also omitted, Oleg Penkovsky being the most egregious example. The complete list of shortcomings is much longer. The volume has nice covers--perhaps the next edition will put more substance between them.

[Hayden B. Peake](#) is the curator of the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection. This section is unclassified in its entirety.

Footnotes:

- [1.](#) For an early treatment of the *Stasi* in German, see Karl Wilhelm Fricke, *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit* (Cologne, FRG: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1984). A victim of the *Stasi* himself, Fricke was abducted from West Berlin in 1955. An updated version of his book was published in 1991.
- [2.](#) The Gauck Authority was the German federal agency charged in the early 1990s with cataloging and examining some 6 million East German intelligence files.
- [3.](#) Markus Wolf, with Anne McElvoy, *The Man Without A Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 1999), 367 pages.
- [4.](#) Edward N. Peterson, *The Secret Police and the Revolution: The Fall of the German Democratic Republic* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).
- [5.](#) Edward N. Peterson, *The Secret Police and the Revolution: The Fall of the German Democratic Republic* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002) and Mike Dennis, *The Stasi: Myth and Reality* (London, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2003).
- [6.](#) The MfS intercepted the phone calls of West German Chancellor Kohl and those in his immediate circle, which could have proven embarrassing if made public as part of the *Stasi* files.
- [7.](#) "Women of Valor: Why Israel Doesn't Send Women into Combat," *Policy Review*, Fall 1991, pp. 65-67.
- [8.](#) *History of Warfare* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1993), p. 76.
- [9.](#) H. Keith Melton. *Ultimate Spy* (London, UK: DK Publishing, 2002).
- [10.](#) Ewen Montagu. *The Man Who Never Was* (New York, NY: J. P. Lippincott, 1954).
- [11.](#) For an analysis of Operation MINCEMEAT based on German records describing their reaction to the attempted deception, see Klaus-Jurgen Muller, "On the Difficulties of Writing Intelligence History," *Studies In Intelligence*, Vol. 30, Fall 1986, pp. 57-62.
- [12.](#) *The Double-Cross System* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972).
- [13.](#) *The Games of the Foxes* (New York, NY: McKay, 1971).
- [14.](#) Richard Deacon, with Nigel West, *SPY!* (London, UK: Grafton Books, 1988).
- [15.](#) See also the review by Emily Wilson in *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp.

161-163.

[16](#). The Summer 1988 issue of Studies in Intelligence contains an article on the White Lady network with impressive details and maps of its operations. Proctor adds new details and also provides a map of the network adding data from previously unknown primary sources that she uncovered in Belgium.

[17](#). American Heritage Dictionary, Houghton Mifflin, 3rd digital edition, 1992.

[18](#). Counterspy was a quarterly and the quote cited by Thomas appeared in the Winter 1975 issue--Vol. 2, Number 2--published in the first quarter of the year, though no month is indicated. Welch's name does not appear, nor does his upcoming Athens address. This is the issue wherein Philip Agee advocated the "neutralization of its [CIA] people working abroad" by publicizing their names so that they could no longer operate clandestinely.

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